Separation of Powers Helps U.S. Constitution Work

Thus the theory of insulation of powers depends both on distinct functions vested in all(prenominal) stageing and on a rigorously preserved policy-making independence, which the Framers of the piece were c atomic number 18ful to ensure.

The Constitution does not call for a rigid separation of powers, but rather for a system of checks and balances knowing to prevent any one branch of political science from comme il faut too powerful. The separation of powers is more accurately described as "a sharing of powers by recognized institutions" (Peltason, 1979, p. 24). Each branch of government has some control over the activities of the other branches, and a mutual cooperation among branches is incumbent in order for the government to pack its business. This intricate blending of powers among terce politically independent institutions makes the concept of the separation of powers a workable, effective one.

When the Constitution was creation drafted by the Framers, some critics feared that this blending of power violated a prefatorial political maxim essential to the preservation of liberty: that the legislative, executive, and court departments ought to be separate and distinct" (The Federalist, 1945, p. 321). Writing in Federalist write up zero(prenominal) 47, James capital of Wisconsin examined this objection, which held that "the several departments of power are distributed and blended in such a manner as to once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of act upon" (The Federalist, p

In Federalist Paper No. 48, Madison goes on to argue that the degree of separation necessary to maintaining a free government cannot be maintained unless at that place is a connection between departments, enough to give separately one a constitutional control over the others. Madison noted that "power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually tranquil from passing the limits assigned to it" (The Federalist, 1945, p. 331). The Constitution marks the boundaries between the three departments, which Madison called "parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power" (The Federalist, p. 331).

But, argued Madison, this pledge is not an adequate defense against the more powerful members of government encroaching on the powers of the weaker members. Madison reminded his critics that in a republican form of government such as the one being proposed by the U.S. Constitution, the dangers from the exercise of legislative power are just as great as the danger from a world-beater or queen in an absolute monarchy. Madison cautioned us that "it is against the enterprising ambition [of the legislature] that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions" (The Federalist, p. 332).

To support his argument in estimation of a blending of powers, Madison cited the great political philosopher Montesquieu, who utilise the British Constitution as the standard for judging political institutions and the preservation of liberty. In the British system of government, powers were indeed dual-lane among the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments, disputing the idea that the three branches had to be totally separate and distinct. Thus when Montesquieu argued that "'There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates,' he did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other" (The Federalist, 1945, p. 323). The
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